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Innovation alliances: Balancing value creation dynamics,  
competitive intensity and market overlap 
 
 
Bouncken, R./Fredrich, V./Kraus, S./Ritala, P. (2019): Innovation alliances: Balancing value creation 
dynamics, competitive intensity and market overlap, Journal of Business Research (accepted). 
 
Abstract 
When created and captured value is unbalanced in innovation alliances, instabilities may emerge. 
Competitive tensions between the partners may further destabilize the value creation process. How 
these dynamics affect the outcomes of innovation alliances is still far from clear. This study focuses 
on expert power, relative private and common benefits, and perceived competitive intensity as well 
as structural market overlap between partners. While direct effects of expert power or the (im-) 
balances in intra-alliance innovation-related value dynamics do not emerge, we find that these effects 
are strongly moderated by the level of competition. When perceived competitive intensity is high, the 
partner's expert power turns out to be less beneficial, and imbalance towards private benefits becomes 
detrimental for value creation. On the other hand, when the market overlap between the partners is 
high, the expert power of partners, as well as common benefits become more beneficial to innovation-
related value creation. 
 





Grounded in the resource-based view and knowledge-based view theories, innovation alliances 
involve partners who use complementarities of resources for new technologies, products and services 
(e.g. Barney, 1991; Grant, 1996; Harrison, Hitt, Hoskisson, & Ireland, 2001; Kale, Singh, & 
Perlmutter, 2000; Nonaka, 1994). Such relationships are far from harmonious – rather, they are full 
of instability, bargaining, and imbalances in private and common benefits (Bouncken & Fredrich, 
2012). Accordingly, there is increasing interest on how value is created and captured within 
innovation alliances (Ritala & Hurmelinna-Laukkanen, 2009, 2013; Ozmel, Yavuz, Reuer, & Zenger, 
2017). Some alliance partners are able to squeeze more benefits than others due to power differences 
from expertise (Bouncken & Fredrich, 2016; Maloni & Benton, 2000) or differences in intra-alliance 
value capture strategies (Lavie, 2009). Uneven balance might lead to alliance failure and lowered 
performance (Inkpen & Beamish, 1997; Fredrich, Bouncken, & Kraus, 2019). Alliance relationships 
also involve tensions from the competitive positioning of partners (Das & Teng, 2000). Competitive 
tensions come in different forms, and can include perceived competitive intensity but also merely 
structural market overlap (Chen, Kuo-Hsien, & Tsai, 2007). Market overlap, as such, can have 
advantages as it potentially helps knowledge diffusion through the improved relative absorptive 
capacity between partners from a similar background (Fredrich et al., 2019; Lane & Lubatkin, 1998). 
While we know that imbalances in private and common benefits as well as competitive tensions 
can be detrimental for alliance relationships, we still do not fully understand the intra-alliance 
dynamics (Bouncken, Clauß, & Fredrich, 2016; Dyer, Singh, & Hesterly, 2018). Our article 
contributes to this gap by examining how alliance partners’ expertise, the distribution of private and 
common benefits, and competitive positioning of the alliance partners affect the overall value created 
in the innovation alliance. Value creation in innovation alliances benefits from expert power partners, 
but suffers from imbalanced distribution of private benefits. Furthermore, we argue that competitive 
intensity between alliance partners negatively moderates the positive effects of partner expertise and 
common benefits, while structural market overlap has a positively moderating role.  
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We find mixed support for our hypotheses in a sample of N=347 dyadic innovation alliances. 
Expert power partners and distribution of private and common benefits are not directly significant. 
However, under high levels of perceived competitive intensity, partners’ expert power turns out to be 
negative for innovation-related value creation, while the opposite occurs under high levels of market 
overlap. Similarly, competitive intensity and market overlap have opposite consequences for 
innovation-related private and common benefits.  
Overall, we provide novel findings on the intra-alliance dynamics of partner expertise, and the 
distribution of private and common benefits, helping to better understand the “value capture rights” 
(Ozmel et al., 2017) or “value capture strategies” (Lavie, 2009). Furthermore, we support Chen et al. 
(2007) in that perceived competitive intensity and structural market overlap can have different 
consequences. 
 
2 Theoretical background 
The resource-based view and the knowledge-based view sparked research on resource 
complementarities in alliance research (e.g. Barney, 1991; Grant, 1996; Harrison et al., 2001; Kale et 
al., 2000; Nonaka, 1994). Resource complementarities create value for allying parties. Value is 
defined as the willingness to pay by the end customers (Garcia-Castro & Aguilera, 2015). Firms 
engage in alliances when the partners expect to create more value than what they could achieve alone 
(Das & Teng, 2000). Lavie (2009) defines value-creation strategies as those that generate benefits 
that are shared by the partners, and value-capture strategies as those that determine how these 
collective benefits are split. Both are interdependent processes, but also involve dynamics. Firms not 
only care about the absolute value capture, but also total value creation and their relative inputs and 
relative value capture (Fernandez, Le Roy, & Gnyawali, 2014; Lavie, Haunschild, & Khanna, 2012). 
The result is a constant oscillation between bargaining and control, where the partners continuously 
evaluate, adapt, and negotiate inputs to value creation and gains from value capture (Khanna, Gulati, 
& Nohria, 1998; Lavie, 2009; Zeng & Chen, 2003). 
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In innovation alliances, these dynamics are even more critical because of uncertainty over the 
outcomes (Bouncken, Fredrich, & Kraus, 2019) that rely on the integration of complementary 
resources, most importantly knowledge (Dhanaraj & Parkhe, 2006; Grant & Baden-Fuller, 2004). 
Partners with a strong knowledge base and expertise (“expert power”, Maloni & Benton, 2000) – also 
possess high bargaining power (Clauss & Bouncken, 2019). Thus, firms with high access to relevant 
knowledge have a strong ability to affect value creation and capture (Ozmel et al., 2017). 
Industry position and related competitive dynamics play an important role in the value dynamics 
of innovation alliances. Relatedly, “coopetition” research shows that collaboration with competitors 
can provide positive and negative implications for firms’ innovation (Bouncken, Fredrich, Ritala, & 
Kraus, 2018; Park, Srivastava, & Gnyawali, 2014; Ritala, Kraus, & Bouncken, 2016). Coopetitors 
may integrate, share and learn knowledge more effectively (Ritala & Hurmelinna-Laukkanen, 2009). 
However, the firms’ competitive position is a source of tensions. The implicit rivalry might lead to 
over-protectiveness and more selective sharing of knowledge, as well as instability, tension, and 
suboptimal innovation outcomes compared to non-rivals (Bouncken et al., 2019; Das & Teng, 2000; 
Nieto & Santamaría, 2007; Raza-Ullah, Bengtsson, & Kock, 2014).  
 
3 Conceptual framework and hypotheses 
Our model (see Fig. 1) aims to explain intra-alliance dynamics related to knowledge-based bargaining 
positions as well as “net value capture” between partners (Ozmel et al., 2017). Furthermore, we 
examine the role of competitive overlap for innovation (Nieto & Santamaría, 2007; Kraus, Meier, 
Niemand, Bouncken, & Ritala, 2018). Previous literature has provided inconsistent results over the 
role of competition and its innovation-related mechanisms in alliances (Bouncken, Gast, Kraus, & 
Bogers, 2015). The inconsistency might be attributable to how competitive tension differs between 
different pairs of firms. Some firms perceive their competitors as a more direct threat than others 
(Gnyawali, He, & Madhavan, 2006). Perceived tension is important, since it is the managerial 
perception of competition (Chen et al., 2007). Market overlap is a structural feature related to the 
industry, and reflects the alliance partners’ competitive positioning (i.e. to which extent collaborating 
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firms operate in the same markets). Market overlap and perceived tensions need not necessarily go 
hand in hand. Market overlap is a structural feature in the firms’ relative positioning, while perceived 




French Jr. and Raven (1959) describe expert power as the power source’s access to knowledge and 
skills desired by the power target. Expert power partners have market reputation or technological 
expertise related to the problem and may provide further informational advantages (Stern, Dukerich, 
& Zajac, 2014). Innovation-related value creation improves through the access to partners’ expertise 
and abilities, and indirectly via legitimation and reputation associated with powerful partners (Maloni 
& Benton, 2000). Expert power partners can increase isolating mechanisms against other firms 
outside the relationship (Lavie et al., 2012). Isolating mechanisms (accompanied by rare, inimitable, 
non-substitutable, and valuable resources, see in the RBV) establish imitation barriers and drive value 
creation and capture. Thus, collaboration with an expert power partner will increase the innovation-
related value created in alliances. 
Hypothesis 1: Expert power of a focal firm’s alliance partner is positively associated with 
innovation-related value creation in the alliance. 
However, when the stakes in the alliance grow higher in terms of competitive tensions, see for 
example the alliance between Samsung and Sony (Gnyawali & Park, 2011), we expect that partner 
expertise is less beneficial, given the rising instabilities in the alliance. Strong bargaining power (e.g., 
with respect to interdependence or accessibility of alternatives) allows to (re-)negotiate the terms of 
alliance contracts, to skew clauses to their benefit, and to directly influence the outcomes (Lavie, 
2007; Ozmel et al., 2017). The incompleteness of contracts and the dynamics that follow alliance 
formation allow for further bargaining (Reuer, Zollo, & Singh, 2002). In case of competitive tension, 
the higher power of the partner creates a risk of lowering total value creation because the power holder 
might limit their inputs to value creation. Lavie (2007: 1187) points out: “the relative bargaining 
power of partners in the alliance portfolio constrains the firm's appropriation capacity, especially 
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when many of these partners compete in the focal firm's industry.” Indeed, the expert partner might 
be perceived as a threat in situations with high competitive intensity, and accordingly, the focal firm 
might scope down its knowledge sharing and value creating efforts. 
Hypothesis 2a: Perceived competition intensity negatively moderates the relationship between 
alliance partner’s expert power and innovation-related value creation in the alliance. 
 
While the prospect of collaborating with a strong partner under high competitive tension may be 
harmful, such tensions are perceptional and not necessarily related to the structure of the industry 
(Chen et al., 2007). A partner with a similar industry profile does not necessarily bring negative 
tensions. Horizontal market overlap provides understanding of shared technologies, institutional 
issues, and customer preferences (Gnyawali & Park, 2011). This improves innovation-related value 
creation. First, an expert power partner allows to shift the typical scale advantages towards scope 
advantages (Dussauge, Garrette, & Mitchell, 2000), increasing the prospects of inter-firm learning 
and knowledge creation. Second, the benefit of an expert power partner’s legitimacy increases in 
situations with high market overlap. The partner’s expertise can help build legitimacy in the field in 
which innovation will be introduced (Ansari, Garud, & Kumaraswamy, 2016). 
Hypothesis 2b: Market overlap between the focal firm and the alliance partner positively 
moderates the relationship between alliance partner’s expert power and innovation-related value 
creation in the alliance. 
Alliance partners can face imbalances between how much input and output is allocated to different 
partners and relatedly how much private and common benefits are pursued (Zeng & Chen, 2003). We 
regard private benefits as a directional asymmetric situation where either of the partner firms captures 
a relatively larger share of the value than it should capture based on its inputs to the value creation. 
Alliance partners will notice disproportionate capturing of value. Common benefits refer to the 
relative “fairness” or equality in the distribution of inputs to the value creation and the abilities to 
capture the created value. Ideally, an alliance involves a fair distribution of benefits where different 
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actors capture value based on their inputs, or, in other words, ‘get what they deserve’ (Khanna et al., 
1998; Luo, 2008). 
Firms can vary in their relative inputs for creating and capturing innovation-related value 
(Brandenburger & Nalebuff, 1996; Dyer, Singh, & Kale, 2008). When one partner’s individual value 
creation inputs are substantially higher (or lower) than the perceived outputs, firms perceive an 
imbalance towards private benefits; thereby lowering the total innovation-related value creation. As 
the imbalance intensifies, the alliance might move into a downward spiral, especially reducing the 
relatively underperforming partner’s motivation to contribute to value creation. Such imbalances are 
an important source of negative dynamics, which can lower the overall alliance performance (Inkpen 
& Beamish, 1997; Das & Teng, 2000; Zeng & Chen, 2003).  
Hypothesis 3a: An increase in private benefits leads to lower innovation-related value creation. 
Yet, when firms perceive a balancing act where the value created and captured follows the logic 
of common benefits, they are more likely to engage in knowledge sharing and other types of value 
creating exchanges, leading to improved innovation outcomes. 
Hypothesis 3b: An increase in common benefits leads to higher innovation-related value creation 
in the alliance. 
 
The potential for a downward spiral increases under highly perceived competitive intensity. The 
uneven capture of value suggests an unfair outcome of the value creation process, but also as a rival 
bargaining context. Such dynamics might lead to firm-level sub-optimization: advantages might fade 
away due to learning races (Hamel, 1991), dysfunctional governance (Smets, Langerak, & Tatikonda, 
2016), and lowering the priority and scope of a specific alliance (Oxley & Sampson, 2004). Rivalry 
might create further conflicts over value distribution, alliance goals, and alliance vision which lead 
to withholding of innovation related-knowledge (Bouncken & Kraus, 2013). Furthermore, we expect 
that perceived competition intensity will also restrict the value creation when alliance partners 
perceive a fair distribution of value (i.e. common benefits). The more intense the perceived 
competition, the more reserved the partners will be in contributing valuable knowledge and 
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capabilities in the alliance (Khanna et al., 1998). Even if partners capture an equal amount of value 
from the alliance, competitive issues create tensions that reach beyond the alliance context, and might 
have long-term consequences. 
Hypothesis 4a, 4b: Perceived competition intensity negatively moderates the relationship 
between (a) private benefits and (b) common benefits and innovation-related value creation in 
the alliance. 
 
While competitive intensity complicates value creation in innovation alliances, market overlap can 
provide advantages (Bouncken et al., 2019). First, the potentially negative effect of private benefits 
is likely to have less negative consequences in cases of high market overlap. There is more value to 
be shared or divided, leaving even an actor who is worse off with higher overall value (i.e. the “cake” 
is larger, see e.g., Ritala & Hurmelinna-Laukkanen, 2009). Second, the similar positive contingency 
applies to alliances where common benefits exit. Then, the market overlap improves the relative 
absorptive capacity and knowledge flow between alliance partners, enabling them to create more 
value in a way that is distributed equally. 
Hypothesis 5a, 5b: Market overlap between the focal firm and the alliance partner positively 
moderates the relationship between (a) private benefits and (b) common benefits and innovation-




This study’s population consists of one of five international trade fairs hosted in Germany from 2014–
2016 (e.g., service providers, manufacturers of electronics and medical devices with SIC codes 3679, 
3841, 7371). Following a key-informant approach, we personally invited firm representatives from 
top and middle management to fill out a paper-and-pencil questionnaire on one specific alliance that 
they were most knowledgeable. We gathered a total of N=2,060 t0-questionnaires at a 29% raw 
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response rate. We recollected data at the same trade fairs a year later during 2015–2017. After 
researching missing secondary data and excluding unknowledgeable respondents or non-innovation 
alliances, our final sample consists of N=347 t1-innovation alliances with one-year-lagged dependent 
information and no significant deviations from the overall population’s firm characteristics (with 
P>.10 for countries of origin, firm sizes, and firm ages).  
Despite a representative sample in t0, a subsample self-selection may occur in t1 (e.g., survival 
bias). Therefore, we applied a binary t1-selection model for countries of origin and all model-implied 
variables yielding a weakly significant overall selection prediction (χ²=79.95, df=62, P=.06), mostly 
attributable (χ²=24.21, df=2, P<.001) towards a home country effect of overrepresented German 
exhibitors (t0: 36% vs. t1: 43%) and underrepresented Chinese exhibitors (t0: 16% vs. t1: 10%) that 
experience greater geographical distance and intertemporal fluctuation. Apart from these expected 
shifts, there is no evidence for further selection biases. On average, responding firms were founded 
in 1982, employed a staff of 625, and achieved sales revenues of € mn. 196 with R&D intensity of 
15.4%. 
 
4.2 Measures and analyses 
We adapted a scale from Lee and Colarelli O'Connor (2003) to the alliance context. Our dependent 
measure labeled as alliance innovation value (AIV) reflects the novelty of the total innovation-related 
value generated in terms of technology and the market. This measure shows composite reliability 
(CRt0=.89, CRt1=.87), convergent validity (average variance extracted, AVEt0=.72, AVEt1=.70), and 
strong parallels to the superiority of product innovation (Lee & Colarelli O'Connor, 2003). 
We used a scale by Maloni and Benton (2000) to assess the partners’ expert power that refers to the 
perception of the partner’s firm holding information or expertise that is valued by the firm (CR=.79, 
AVE=.56). We reviewed several objective dyadic competition measures (Baum & Korn, 1999; Wu, 
2014). Instead of SIC-code similarity, we focus on sales overlap to account for highly diversified 
firms that share the same SIC codes but not necessarily high sales percentages from the same markets. 
Log-standardization of sales percentages (mean=29%, median=20%) yielded an almost bell-shaped 
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measure of market overlap by objectively-oriented competition intensity (=Cobj with skewness S=|–
.80|<2 and kurtosis K=|.03|<7; West, Finch, & Curran, 1995). Subjectively perceived competition 
intensity (=Csub) reflects the competition intensity within the innovation alliance under study 
(originally labeled as coopetition intensity; e.g., Bouncken & Kraus, 2013). Both competition 
measures indicate a highly significant overlap (rhomlr=.26, P<.001; non-parametric Spearman 
rho=.20, P<.001). 
For intra-alliance value creation–capture dynamics, we asked respondents to evaluate (1) “Whose 
relative input/effort for these values is stronger?” and (2) “Who is relatively better at capturing the 
value?” relating to each item of the AIV scale. We calculated two additional variables (–1=‘partner’, 
0=‘equal/ly’, +1=‘we’) for ‘relative capture’ (ranging from –3 to +3) and ‘relative creation’ (ranging 
from –3 to +3) as well as a standardized difference score labeled as ‘firm A’s relative private benefits’ 
(PB=relative capture–relative creation; S=.29, K=2.80). Thus, deviations from zero express the 
magnitude of directional asymmetry towards (negative) firm B or (positive) responding firm A. We 
further calculated a count variable for ‘(symmetric) common benefits’ (CB ranging from 0=‘non-
directional asymmetry’ to 6=‘maximum symmetry’ if all six items are ‘0=equal/ly’; S=–.15, K=–
1.48). We distinguished directional from non-directional asymmetry because it is less ambiguous: 
Highest scores on the CB scale are zeros on the PB scale, but not vice versa. Zeros on the PB scale 
can take on any value on the CB scale (rhomlr=.04, P=.36). 
We controlled for firm- and relationship-specific characteristics. Firm size expresses structural 
determinants of innovation value creation and capture (Chandy & Tellis, 2000). Firm age may reflect 
accumulated business experience and improve efficiency through learning-by-doing routines (Zollo, 
Reuer, & Singh, 2002). Relationship duration accounted for partner-specific experiences, different 
stages, and accumulated total value generated within the innovation alliance (Jap & Ganesan, 2000). 
R&D intensity reflects a firm’s potential to create new value within alliances and its absorptive 
capacity (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990). We further controlled alliance termination before t1 and the 
initial level of the alliance innovation value in t0 to reduce endogeneity from sample selection bias 
and omitted causes of innovation. 
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For hypotheses testing, we used covariance-based structural equation modeling (CB-SEM) 
implemented in Mplus 7.4. We used scaled log-likelihood ratio tests to evaluate global model fit 
under maximum likelihood robust (MLR) estimation (Muthén & Muthén, 1998–2017). Table 1 





5.1 Hypotheses results 




AIVt0 greatly predicts AIVt1 demonstrating the necessity to control for it. We have to reject H1 which 
postulates a positive influence of a partner’s expert power on AIVt1 (model A: β=.02, P=.87). H2a 
assumes a negative moderation of the main effect for linearly growing levels of Csub within the 
alliance. Model B supports this hypothesis (H2a: β=–.35, P=.01). H2b suggests an opposite positive 
moderation of the main effect by log-linearly growing levels of Cobj. We find support for H2b (model 
C: β=.19, P=.04). Both competition intensities show no direct effects on AIVt1. Model D shows results 
of relative private and common benefits and their interactions with both competition intensities. 
Neither linear shifts on the private benefits (H3a: β=–.08, P=.19) nor the common benefits scale show 
significant direct effects on AIVt1 (H3b: β=–.00, P=.99), rejecting hypotheses 3a and 3b. Symmetric 
combinations of relative private benefits and Csub decreased AIVt1 significantly, supporting H4a (β=–
.20, P=.05). Consequently, AIVt1 favors from asymmetric combinations, e.g. strong private benefits 
of firm A under low Csub. We have to reject H4b that assumed a negative moderation effect between 
Csub and common benefits on AIVt1 (β=–.13, P=.19). We find no support for H5a that suggested a 
positive moderation effect between Cobj and private benefits on AIVt1 (β=–.04, P=.49). H5b postulated 
a positive moderation effect between Cobj and common benefits on AIVt1. Results support H5b (β=.12, 
P=.03). All results remain consistent in model E after accounting for additional 3-way interactions to 
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avoid spurious significances (Carte & Russell, 2003). Figure 2 illustrates regions of significance for 
the average marginal effect (i.e. first derivatives) of partner’s expert power on AIVt1 (y-axis) for all 




The profile at the bottom of Fig. 2 shows regions of significance at 5%. Significantly negative/positive 
regions (–/+) emerge for upper/lower bounds of the 95% confidence interval being negative/positive. 
Sign changes indicate insignificant regions (n.s.). Cobj@0.0 and Csub@0.0 marks the sample-specific 
insignificant average marginal effect of EXPOW on AIVt1. Equation 1 shows model C estimates 
extended by a linear 3-way interaction of EXPOW×Csub×Cobj: 
   𝑑𝑑(𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 𝑡𝑡1)
𝑑𝑑(𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸)
= −.01 +. 21∗ × 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 +−.48∗∗∗ × 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 + .05 × 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 × 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶  (1) 
Regions of significance indicate that partner’s expert power diminishes AIVt1 under high Csub and 
below average Cobj. Contrarily, collaborating with expert power partners with above average Cobj will 
improve AIVt1 under below average Csub. 
 
5.2 Robustness testing 
Several post-hoc robustness tests support our results and increase generalizability. We reduced 
common method variance (CMV) by following recommendations of Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Lee, 
and Podsakoff (2003). We used multiple sources and a time-lagged dependent variable. As scalar 
measurement invariance is a precondition to examining latent variables, we checked the sensitivity 
of results by language-based standardization of all Likert-type items, yielding consistent results. We 
evaluated a potential single-source bias by comparing consulting (t0: 36%, t1: 31%) vs. non-consulting 
respondents (t0: 64%, t1: 70%) and found no meaningful differences (all P>.10, Atuahene-Gima, 
Slater, & Olson, 2005). In dealing with unobservable sources of CMV, we constrained all Likert-type 
items to equally load on an uncorrelated confirmatory common method factor, yielding insignificant 
global model improvement. 
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We also checked for potential endogeneity from omitted variables and non-random sample 
selection. Following recommendations by Semadeni, Withers, and Trevis Certo (2014), we applied 
an instrumental variables approach with (1) strongly relevant and (2) truly exogenous instruments. 
(3) Insignificant pairwise Durbin-Wu-Hausman tests show no statistical signs of endogeneity. 
 
6 Discussion  
Strategy and innovation research has started to unlock the dynamics of value creation and capture in 
alliances (Dyer et al., 2008; Lavie, 2007, 2009; Lavie et al., 2012), showing that the two are 
interdependent processes (Dyer et al., 2018). However, it is still unknown how dynamics of value 
creation and appropriation affect the outcomes of innovation alliances. Our study focused on the 
expert power of partners, as well as intra-alliance value creation and capture dynamics by private and 
common benefits. In addition, we examined the focal contingencies in innovation alliances that 
regulate the aforementioned dynamics: the perceptions of competitive intensity between the partners 
as well as the structural market overlap (Chen et al., 2007). While we did not find strong evidence of 
direct effects of expert power or the imbalances in intra-alliance value dynamics for innovation-
related value creation, we found that effects are strongly moderated by perceived competition 
intensity (negatively) and by structural market overlap (positively). When perceived competitive 
intensity is high, the expert power of a focal firm’s partner is less beneficial, and imbalance towards 
private benefits becomes detrimental to innovation-related value creation. Yet, under high market 
overlap, expert power of partners as well as common benefits improve innovation-related value 
creation. 
First, our results demonstrate that innovation alliances are an arena of bargaining, imbalances, 
and instability related to value creation and capture, as suggested in existing alliance research 
(Khanna et al., 1998; Lavie, 2009; Zeng & Chen, 2003). Firms need a ‘balancing act’ between inputs 
to value creation and relative share of value captured. Dynamics may result in negative tensions from 
perceived competitive actions, or in positive tensions from shared industry background. Potential 
imbalances will not affect the outcomes as much as in cases with the tensions present. We contribute 
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to the alliance imbalance and tension literature, which pursue to understand why and when tensions 
arise and how it matters (Inkpen & Beamish, 1997; Das & Teng, 2000; Zeng & Chen, 2003). 
Second, our results provide support for the arguments by Chen et al. (2007) that perceived 
competition intensity between a particular dyad of firms is an idiosyncratic phenomenon, and not 
often related to the actual structural market positioning/overlap. Some competitors are seen as more 
focal than others (Porac, Thomas, Wilson, Paton, & Kanfer, 1995). 
 
7 Conclusion and limitations 
Our research brings new insights into the balancing act in coopetition. In providing opposite 
results for the moderation effects of competition intensity and market overlap, our study introduces a 
new context (innovation alliances and their value creation–capture dynamics) that backs up these 
classic arguments in competitive dynamics literature. 
Our study has some limitations. Looking at one side of dyadic relationships may be insufficient 
to fully address the complex dynamics at play. There might be internal motivations of the firms and 
new structures besides the tensions connected to external tensions (Bouncken et al., 2019; Bouncken, 
Laudien, Fredrich, & Görmar, 2018). Future research could utilize more holistic approaches to collect 
alliance-level data. Despite using a lagged dependent variable, future studies could be more explicit 
about how dynamics evolve over time. Future research might look into other empirical settings with 










N=347 strategic alliances 





Global fit from MLR: χ²=354.79, d.f.=215, P=.000, scaling correction factor for 
MLR=1.063, CFI=.919, TLI=.912, RMSEA=.043, SRMR=.063. 
  
   
Expert power of partner (CR=.79, AVE=.56, FL=.06).  
Source: Maloni and Benton (2000). 
1. Our partner is an expert in its industry. .70a 13.7 
2. Our partner retains business expertise that makes them likely to suggest the 
proper thing to do. 
.88 17.9 
3. We respect the judgment of representatives of our partner. .63 9.8 
 
Perceived competition intensity Csub (CR=.86, AVE=.68, FL=.01).  
Source: Bouncken and Kraus (2013). 
 
1. Our partner is also our competitor, with whom we pursue a common goal. .67a 17.3 
2. We are in close competition with our partner. .89 37.6 
3. We collaborate with this competitor to achieve a common goal. .89 31.6 
 
Alliance innovation value AIVb in t0 (CR=.89, AVE=.72, FL=.28) and t1 (CR=.87, AVE=.70, FL=.29).  
Source: Lee & Colarelli O’Connor (2003). 
How much value does the relationship generate in the following fields? 
(1=no value, 5=very much) 
 
A1. Innovations incorporating technology which is new to customers. 
    t0/t1 
.91a/.90a 
      t0/t1 
 39.9/40.0 
A2. Innovations offering benefits new to the customers. .85/.84 38.6/33.4 
A3. Innovations that introduce many completely new features to the market. .79/.76 27.1/24.0 
 
For each item we additionally ask categorically:  
+1=‘ours/we’, 0=‘equal/ly’, –1=‘partner’s input/partner’ 
  
B1/2/3. Whose relative input/effort for these values is stronger?   
C1/2/3. Who is better in capturing the value?   
a Initial loading fixed to 1 to set the scale of the construct. 





Table 1 Bivariate latent and manifest correlations. 
 
Measures 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 
1. Alliance innovation value AIVt0 .72 .58*** .27*** –.06 .06 –.00 –.02 –.05 .02 .10† –.04 .03 
2. Alliance innovation value AIVt1 .46*** .70 .13* –.07 .05 –.05 –.12* .05 –.04 .11* –.08 –.03 
3. Expert power of partner .20* .08 .56 .07 .12* –.07 .10 –.05 .08 –.08 –.00 –.08 
4. Perceived competition intensity Csub –.01 –.05 .07  .68 .20*** .03 .01 .10 .01 .05 –.00 .08 
5. Log market overlap Cobj .03  .02 .06 .26*** 1.00 –.01 .02 –.04 .15** .05 .01 –.03 
6. Alliance termination (binary) –.02 –.04 –.06 .04 –.02 1.00 .01 .00 –.04 .02 –.07 –.09 
7. Log age of firm A .00 –.09 .10† –.00 .00 .01 1.00 .30*** .28*** –.08 .08 .02 
8. Log size of firm A –.02 .07 –.06 .08 –.01 .01 .32*** 1.00 .04 .02 .03 –.05 
9. Log relationship duration –.00 –.04 .05 .04 .09† –.02 .31*** .03 1.00 –.13* .02 .02 
10. R&D intensity of firm A .16* .13 –.13† .03 .03 .04 –.11 .06 –.17** 1.00 –.03 –.01 
11. Relative private benefits towards firm A –.03 –.08 .01 –.03 .04 –.09† .05 .02 .00 –.10 1.00 .06 
12. Balanced common benefits .04 –.02 .10† .09 –.03 –.10† .00 –.03 .01 –.03 .04 1.00 
Notes: N=347; diagonals represent average variances extracted, below are MLR estimates of zero-order correlations, above non-parametric Spearman correlations. 




Table 2 Hypotheses results. 
 
Path on alliance product 
innovation value AIV in t1  
of N=347 innovation alliances 
 
Model A Model B Model C Model D Model E 
controls  
+ H1 + H2a + H2b + H3, H4, H5 + all 3ways 
AIV in t0 .44***(.074) .46***(.072) .45***(.071) .46***(.071) .47***(.073) 
Alliance termination (binary) –.03(.082) –.01(.083) .01(.080) –.01(.077) .01(.080) 
Log firm A size .11†(.057) .09†(.057) .11†(.056) .08(.056) .08(.076) 
Log firm A age –.12†(.063) –.11†(.063) –.11†(.064) –.10(.066) –.09(.093) 
Log relationship duration .00(.061) –.01(.060) –.02(.061) –.01(.060) –.03(.058) 
Log R&D intensity  .04(.072) .02(.071) .03(.070) .03(.069) .01(.070) 
H1: Expert power (EXPOW) .02(.106) .02(.105) .02(.103) .03(.104) .01(.113) 
Perceived competition Csub  –.03(.090) –.06(.093) –.04(.096) –.13(.095) 
Log market overlap Cobj  – .03(.053) .01(.054) .01(.060) 
H2a: EXPOW×Csub  –.35*(.140) –.43**(.142) –.47**(.154) –.41*(.166) 
H2b: EXPOW×Cobj  – .19*(.088) .20*(.087) .25*(.104) 
H3a: Relative private benefits 
towards firm A (PB) 
   –.08(.057) –.07(.055) 
H3b: Balanced common benefits 
(CB) 
   –.00(.055) .00(.055) 
H4a: PB×Csub    –.20*(.102) –.18†(.101) 
H4b: CB×Csub     –.13(.096) –.15(.093) 
H5a: PB×Cobj    –.04(.057) –.06(.067) 
H5b: CB×Cobj     .12*(.052) .10†(.059) 
EXPOW×PB     –.01(.079) 
EXPOW×CB     .15(.106) 
EXPOW×Cobj×PB     .01(.126) 
EXPOW×Cobj×CB     .11(.088) 
EXPOW×Csub×PB     .10(.158) 
EXPOW×Csub×CB     .25(.182) 
Csub×Cobj     .07(.093) 
Csub×Cobj×PB     –.10(.085) 
Csub×Cobj×CB     –.00(.089) 
EXPOW×Csub×Cobj     .14(.130) 
      
Sample-size adjusted BIC 13,442.16 13,441.43 13,442.67 13,448.76 13,465.19 
MLR log-likelihood   
(free parameters) –6,643.44(58) –6,640.40(60) –6,638.35(62) –6,633.36(68) –6,628.19(78) 
Scaling correction factor 1.126 1.125 1.112 1.100 1.069 
Scaled chi-square difference TRd 
(Δdf):   χ²(2)=5.61
† χ²(2)=5.62† χ²(6)=10.20 χ²(10)=12.07 
Improvement of MLR model fit:   P=.06 P=.06 P=.11 P=.28 







Fig. 1 Research model. 
Alliance partner’s expert 
power (EXPOW)
as perception of the partner’s 
firm holding information or 
expertise that is valued by the 
firm, e.g. specific abilities of 
technology expertise, market 
knowledge, reputation, etc.
Alliance innovation value 
(AIV)
reflects the total innovation-
related value creation in terms 
of technology and the market 
as an outcome of the alliance
Relational tension contingencies
Competition intensity (Csub) by perceived
measure that drives managers’ decisions
Market overlap (Cobj) that reflects potential 
similarities and complementarities
H1
Private (PB) and common 
benefits (CB)
(a) as firm A’s realization of 
private benefits at the 
expense of firm B
(b) as an equal realization of 
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